It is hard not to be the center of controversy when you're a site like WikiLeaks that specializes in exposing information that was never intended for the general public. The whistleblowing, freedom of the press advocate is in hot water again as it is the victim itself of a breach that exposed US State Department communications that had been leaked to it.
It gets sticky quick. You have WikiLeaks which doesn't go out and do its own spying per se. It is simply the intermediary--a benefactor of the efforts of others who stumble upon, or have privileged access to, information they feel should be shared with the world, but who fear the repercussions of doing so personally. Then you have the sources themselves who may be altruistic lovers of open disclosure, or could have their own agenda behind exposing the information. Then there are the subjects of the leaked information who are at once both villains of whatever insidious information was being withheld from the public, and victims of having said insidiousness made public.
WikiLeaks is a sort of Robin Hood of free speech. It uncovers duplicitous backroom deals, and reveals shady agreements between key players in corporate and government affairs all in the interest of protecting average citizens and consumers. It is like Ralph Nader on steroids.
It is very easy to cross the line, though, from hero to villain. Not all confidential data is created equally, and not all of it should be shared with the public. Some information is secret because of its nefarious nature, but some information is kept secret because it has broader global and national security implications.
Now, the tables are turned. A data breach exposed a WikiLeaks file containing hundreds of thousands of US State Department cables. WikiLeaks has responded by publicly posting the entire collection online--unredacted, and with names of confidential sources exposed.
WikiLeaks has crossed that line. First it became the victim, and now it is has become the villain. It is heroic on some level to reveal information that should be public but is being covered up, but it goes too far when WikiLeaks starts sharing information just for the sake of sharing information--as if all information is equal and no secret is worth keeping.
Exposing the names of political informants and confidential sources could put those individuals and their families at risk. These are people who went out on a limb, and WikiLeaks is sawing the branch.
If you ignore the personal risk, the move by WikiLeaks still does significant harm to United States diplomatic and intelligence gathering efforts around the world. It will be much harder to find cooperative sources if the United States can't ensure their anonymity.
Imagine how quickly WikiLeaks flow of information would dry up if those who shared information with WikiLeaks were outed. I appreciate the noble ideals of WikiLeaks, but I think it is shooting itself in the foot, and taking down some innocent people along with it.
Friday, 2 September 2011
Thursday, 1 September 2011
Supreme inconsistency? McKenna rulings 180 degrees apart
So can the Washington Attorney General do what he wants to do, or is he merely a working stiff lawyer, having to heed the directives of state officials?
That question was up for debate Thursday after the state Supreme Court handed down two, seemingly conflicting rulings about how Attorney General Rob McKenna must go about his job. In City of Seattle v. McKenna, the justices unanimously rejected Seattle’s attempt to force McKenna to drop his participation in a lawsuit with other Republican attorneys general who oppose new federal health care legislation. Gov. Chris Gregoire, a Democrat, is opposed to McKenna’s part in the national lawsuit and has questioned why he has the ability to take part, absent a request from her or some other state official. But the justices wrote: “The people of the state of Washington have, by statute, vested the attorney general with broad authority, and Attorney General McKenna’s decision to sue to enjoin the enforcement of the (health care law) falls within that broad authority.”
However in another Thursday ruling, Goldmark v. McKenna, the Supreme Court told McKenna he must represent Lands Commissioner Peter Goldmark, who wants McKenna to appeal a right-of-way case in Okanogan County. The county Public Utility District won a lower-court case allowing it to run power lines across some state trust land that Goldmark manages. McKenna had balked at Goldmark’s request. In a split decision, the Supreme Court told McKenna to take the case.
“Under the statutes, the responsibility is clear. Because we find no discretion within this duty, we… direct the attorney general to provide the commissioner with legal representation,” the ruling said.
In a dissent, Justice Debra Stephens said her colleagues were trying to have it both ways.
“We say in McKenna that the attorney general has ‘discretionary authority to act in any court, state or federal, trial or appellate, on ‘a matter of public concern,’ provided that there is a ‘cognizable common law or statutory cause of action.’’ Moreover, the McKenna decision rejects the argument that ‘where the governor and attorney general disagree, the attorney general may not proceed in the name of the State.’ This view is at odds with the majority’s analysis. Reading the two cases together, it is unclear why a writ of mandamus is appropriate to force the attorney general to follow the commissioner’s wishes in this litigation but is inappropriate in McKenna. Consistent with our decision in McKenna, I would recognize that the attorney general’s duty to represent state officers in litigation is generally not subject to a writ of mandamus. While the attorney general’s role to provide legal counsel is mandated by statute, it fundamentally involves discretion and legal judgment entrusted to an independently elected official. The statutory duty is for the attorney general to exercise discretion. This is no mere ministerial task subject to the extraordinary writ of mandamus.”
Jason Mercier, an analyst with the Washington Policy Center, was also struck by the apparent incongruity of the two decision.
“So under these two rulings, is the Attorney General the independently elected attorney of the people, or merely the government’s attorney tasked with rubber-stamping his clients wishes?” Mercier asked. “If the first, independently electing the people’s attorney makes sense. If instead the Attorney General is nothing more than the government’s attorney, perhaps the office would be better suited as an appointed position.”
That question was up for debate Thursday after the state Supreme Court handed down two, seemingly conflicting rulings about how Attorney General Rob McKenna must go about his job. In City of Seattle v. McKenna, the justices unanimously rejected Seattle’s attempt to force McKenna to drop his participation in a lawsuit with other Republican attorneys general who oppose new federal health care legislation. Gov. Chris Gregoire, a Democrat, is opposed to McKenna’s part in the national lawsuit and has questioned why he has the ability to take part, absent a request from her or some other state official. But the justices wrote: “The people of the state of Washington have, by statute, vested the attorney general with broad authority, and Attorney General McKenna’s decision to sue to enjoin the enforcement of the (health care law) falls within that broad authority.”
However in another Thursday ruling, Goldmark v. McKenna, the Supreme Court told McKenna he must represent Lands Commissioner Peter Goldmark, who wants McKenna to appeal a right-of-way case in Okanogan County. The county Public Utility District won a lower-court case allowing it to run power lines across some state trust land that Goldmark manages. McKenna had balked at Goldmark’s request. In a split decision, the Supreme Court told McKenna to take the case.
“Under the statutes, the responsibility is clear. Because we find no discretion within this duty, we… direct the attorney general to provide the commissioner with legal representation,” the ruling said.
In a dissent, Justice Debra Stephens said her colleagues were trying to have it both ways.
“We say in McKenna that the attorney general has ‘discretionary authority to act in any court, state or federal, trial or appellate, on ‘a matter of public concern,’ provided that there is a ‘cognizable common law or statutory cause of action.’’ Moreover, the McKenna decision rejects the argument that ‘where the governor and attorney general disagree, the attorney general may not proceed in the name of the State.’ This view is at odds with the majority’s analysis. Reading the two cases together, it is unclear why a writ of mandamus is appropriate to force the attorney general to follow the commissioner’s wishes in this litigation but is inappropriate in McKenna. Consistent with our decision in McKenna, I would recognize that the attorney general’s duty to represent state officers in litigation is generally not subject to a writ of mandamus. While the attorney general’s role to provide legal counsel is mandated by statute, it fundamentally involves discretion and legal judgment entrusted to an independently elected official. The statutory duty is for the attorney general to exercise discretion. This is no mere ministerial task subject to the extraordinary writ of mandamus.”
Jason Mercier, an analyst with the Washington Policy Center, was also struck by the apparent incongruity of the two decision.
“So under these two rulings, is the Attorney General the independently elected attorney of the people, or merely the government’s attorney tasked with rubber-stamping his clients wishes?” Mercier asked. “If the first, independently electing the people’s attorney makes sense. If instead the Attorney General is nothing more than the government’s attorney, perhaps the office would be better suited as an appointed position.”
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